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Philip Donegan lodged an appeal against two convictions of rape under the Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act 2009 section 1, pertaining to two female complainers. This appeal was argued on the 
grounds that: (i) the Moorov doctrine should not have been applicable given the differences 
between the two complaints and that (ii) complainer A lacked credibility to such an extent that no 
reasonable jury would be able to accept her evidence as truthful. 
A. THE MOOROV DOCTRINE 
 
The Moorov doctrine2 allows for corroboration to be offered by special means: that two or more 
charges can mutually corroborate one another if sufficiently connected. Modern interpretation of 
the doctrine has dictated that this similarity must be in terms of time, place and circumstance.3 
Although not limited to application to sexual crimes, it has particular significance within this category 
of offences given the obvious problems of corroborating acts which are likely to have taken place in 
private between two individual with competing accounts of the same facts. 
In response to the appellant’s argument, the Court in Donegan recognised the different 
circumstances advanced by each of the two female complainers: complainer A’s complaint pertained 
to vaginal, anal and oral rape followed by denial from Donegan of any criminality and a refusal to 
accept the significance of the incident (despite complainer A’s visible distress). Complainer B 
detailed consensual vaginal intercourse which then continued after consent had been withdrawn, 
followed by Donegan’s contrition and acknowledgement (witnessed by a third party) of the breach 
of trust which had occurred. The Court’s view was that, despite these differences, unity could be 
satisfied by several common features of the two cases: Match.com as the original point of contact 
between the parties, the ages of the complainers, their ages in relation to the accused, the 
vulnerability of both complainers, the calculated behaviour of the accused towards both women, his 
“accelerated development of a sexual relationship in each case”4 and his alcohol consumption at the 
time of the offences. The Court noted the trial judge’s approach to dealing with the similarities 
between the two offences might not “seem entirely conventional” but advised that “the 
circumstances just reflected human conduct and sexual mores in the modern world.”5  
However, it could be argued the Court’s approach in Donegan is not especially unconventional. The 
decision comes against the history of recognition that the doctrine can be applied even where there 
are differences between cases6 and recent applications of Moorov in particular have adopted the 
doctrine in a flexible and realistic manner. Particular flexibility has been granted in relation to the 
length of time which can be accepted between offences as evidenced by S v HM Advocate7 where an 
                                                          
∗ I am grateful to Professor Fiona Leverick for her comments on an earlier draft of this work. 
1 [2019] HCJAC 10. 
2 As originated from Moorov v HM Advocate 1930 J.C 68. 
3 MR v HM Advocate 2013 J.C 212 
4 Donegan (n 1) at para 8. 
5 Donegan (n 1) at para 9. 
6 Reynolds v HM Advocate 1995 J.C 142 
7 2015 SSCR 62. See also the recent decisions of JL v HM Advocate [2016] HCJAC 61 and RG v HM Advocate 
[2016] HCJAC 60. Both involved charges libelling sexual abuse with significant time between the alleged 
offences. The Moorov doctrine was held to apply in JL but in RG the convictions were quashed as it was held 
18 year gap was accepted. In accepting this exceptionally long lapse of time between offences, the 
Court emphasised that where a time gap between offences is significant, a high degree of similarity 
between cases is required. Elsewhere, other approaches towards allowing special means of offering 
corroboration has been equally flexible: in the recent case of Wilson v HM Advocate8, evidence of 
distress exhibited by the complainer 30 hours after the alleged incident was allowed to be put 
before the jury for their consideration as supporting evidence of her lack of consent. Although 
distress has long been an established means of providing corroboration for a lack of consent9, the 
time frame has been restrictive historically 10. More than just an extension of time beyond what had 
previously been accepted by the courts11, Wilson also allowed for the evidence of distress to be put 
before the jury, despite the fact that the complainer had been seen by another witness earlier in the 
day in an unstressed state- something the Court in McCrann12 had previously highlighted as 
problematic in the application of the distress doctrine. The Court’s application of Moorov is, 
therefore, arguably an extension of an increasingly flexible approach to the special means by which 
corroboration can be offered in sexual offences in particular.  
The application of the Moorov doctine in Donegan, whether accepted as unconventional or simply 
seen as a further, consistent development of the doctrine, is at one level positive. Whilst the 
controversy surrounding corroboration continues to be the subject of discussion amongst Scottish 
commentators13, the reality for complainers of sexual offence already engaged with the system at 
this time remains that in order to see their accuser convicted, the essential facts of the case must be 
corroborated- and this can be especially difficult in this category of offences. Cowan’s recent article 
acts as an important reminder about the significance of such offences (both in terms of volume and 
treatment), setting out an up to date picture of the Scottish landscape. She notes that such crimes 
make up 75 per cent of COPFS High Court work.14 When discussing the “rancorous debates” about 
corroboration which followed the Carloway Review, Raitt  previously commented that if such 
debates were “to galvanise a broader debate about the levels of gender violence in Scottish society, 
the Carloway Review would have an entirely different legacy.”15 This point, also evident in Cowan’s 
recent work, will be returned to below. Burman and Brooks-Hay have recently considered why 
Scottish conviction rates for rape remain so low, despite the fact that victims are now more willing 
to report such offences to the Police, linking this to how procedural safeguards are used in practice 
for those who give evidence.16 In 2017/18, the Scottish Government statistics show that a total of 
247 people were proceeded against for charges of rape and attempted rape. Of these: 2 per cent 
were later deserted, 36 per cent resulted in findings of acquittal via a not guilty finding, 19 per cent 
                                                          
the similarities between the offences were superficial and there existed substantial differences between the 
allegations 
8 2017 JC 135 
9 Yates v HM Advocate 1977 SLT (Notes) 42 
10 See Moore v HM Advocate 1990 JC 371 
11 24 hours in P v HM Advocate 2005 SCCR 764. 
12 2003 SCCR 722. 
13 For recent discussion of corroboration and the concept of access to justice for female complainers, see 
Carirns, I. Access to Justice' for Complainers? The Pitfalls of the Scottish Government's Case to Abolish 
Corroboration, chapter in  P. Duff  and P.R Ferguson (eds), Scottish Criminal Evidence Law: Current 
Developments and Future Trends (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017) 
14 S. Cowan. “Sense and sensibilities: A feminist critique of legal interventions against sexual violence” (2019), 
23 Edin. L.R 22, quoting the Inspectorate Prosecution in Scotland. 
15 F. Raitt. “Cooroboration in cases of gender violence: a case for special treatment” (2014) 18(1) Edin. L.R 93 at 
97. 
16 M. Burman and O. Brooks-Hay. “Victims are more willing to report rape, so why are conviction rates still 
woeful?” Conversation 8 Mar (2018) 
resulted in acquittal through the not proven verdict and 43 per cent resulted in the charge being 
proved. To draw a comparison, 539 people were proceeded against for robbery and 75 per cent of 
these proceedings resulted in a conviction.17 
B. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINER 
 
The introduction of section 288DA into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (herein after 
CPSA) has been an important journey for victims of sexual offences. Notably in Grimmond18, the 
Appeal Court rejected the Crown’s submission that expert testimony was required to explain why 
two boys would disclose their evidence of sexual abuse in stages. Although the general rule that an 
expert cannot give evidence on matters of ordinary human nature and behaviour remains, section 
275C of the CPSA introduced19 exceptions to this rule for sexual offences, allowing psychological or 
psychiatric evidence to be provided on the complainer’s behaviour in order to rebut adverse 
inferences to their credibility or reliability as a witness. Section 288DA of the CPSA, as introduced by 
the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harms Act 2016, took this position further, formally undermining 
the Appeal Court’s assertion in Grimmond that knowledge pertaining to delayed and staggered 
reporting in sexual offences was within the expected knowledge of a jury. Instead the section 
formally recognises the prejudices which exist in relation to delayed reporting, holding that judicial 
direction must be provided to the jury of a sexual offence case in order to clarify that a delay in 
reporting does not speak to the credibility of the complainer. The difficulty of disclosing complaints 
of sexual offences has, therefore, been recognised formally by the creation of section 288DA.20  
The circumstances of Donegan include the fact that complainer A had initially provided inconsistent 
accounts to investigating officers, initially denying that any offence had taken place (despite the 
suspicion of the officers that this was not in fact the case). Her anxiety over disclosing the rape was 
later explained by the witness herself during her testimony when she spoke of her shame and 
humiliation over the incident. It was further evidenced by her attendance at her GP following the 
incident (where she did disclose that she had been the victim of a sexual offence). Rejecting the 
argument that no reasonable jury could consider complainer A credible, the Court emphasised the 
newly introduced section 288DA. However, their judgment also discussed the “wholly 
inappropriate”21 behaviour of the original trial judge, who engaged in activity akin to a cross-
examination of the complainer over her lack of initial reporting of the offence: 
 “You could phone the police. You could walk out your property and get help, go to a 
neighbour, contact a friend, contact the police….Did you consider any of these things?”22 
This is not the first time that the Appeal Court has had to remind lower court judges of the 
boundaries of cross examination: recent cases such as CJW23 and M24 have reiterated that sections 
274 and 275 of the CPSA, which pertain to the leading of sexual history evidence, were never 
                                                          
17 Scottish Government, 2018. Criminal Proceedings in Scotland 2017-18. Percentages calculated from the 
figures in Table 2(a). 
18 2002 SLT 508. 
19 Through the Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004. 
20 See SPICe Briefing 2015. Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm Scotland Bill p15-17 esp. Available at: 
http://www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S4/SB_15-
74_Abusive_Behaviour_and_Sexual_Harm_Scotland_Bill.pdf (Last accessed 26 March 2019) 
21 Donegan (n 1) at para 55. 
22 Donegan (n 1) at para 54. 
23 [2016] HCJAC 111. CJW explored Grimmond in obiter, commenting that section 275C had effectively 
reversed the common law as stated in Grimmond in cases involving sexual offences to which it applied. 
24 M v HM Advocate (No.2) 2013 SLT 380. 
intended to replace the common law position on the admission of such character evidence. They 
emphasised in both cases that such evidence is collateral and a threat to the dignity of the 
complainer in criminal proceedings. Cowan comments that the lack of judicial engagement with 
sexual offences is “neglectful”25 and that guidance and leadership should be offered by the courts on 
the issue of interpreting legislation. Such guidance is evident in all three of these recent decisions. 
The trial judge’s behaviour discussed in Donegan, although the subject of criticism by the Appeal 
Court, is perhaps not surprising. Following the introduction of sections 274 and 275 into the CPSA in 
200226, Burman et al’s socio-legal evaluation of sexual history and character evidence in the Scottish 
Courts concluded that the legislation had failed to meet its aims and that, in practice, section 275 
was subject to liberal interpretations.27 Drawing on Burman et al’s work, Cowan includes data 
pertaining to section 275 applications from a three month period in 2016. This data shows that 84 
per cent of applications to include sexual history evidence were accepted (either partly or in full) and 
only 16 per cent were rejected. Ninety per cent of these applications were unopposed by the Crown. 
One reading of this could be that given so few applications are opposed, the statutory test contained 
within sections 274 and 275 has excluded inappropriate evidence which might otherwise have gone 
before the court; that is to say, it is working. However, recent cases such as CJW illustrate that 
evidence has been allowed under section 275 applications is not the type of evidence that the Court 
of Appeal considers to be admissible or within the spirit of the statutory provisions28. As such, these 
figures should be a concern.   
As a feature of law, section 288DA is cautiously welcomed. Such caution arises from the larger 
problems pointed to by Cowan and other members of our critical legal feminist community: 
problems which legal changes alone may not be able to meaningfully remedy.29 Despite this context, 
however, it would nevertheless be a concerning and regressive step if section 288DA30 faced the lack 
of practical implementation that has been evidenced in relation to rape shield legislation, both by 
Burman et al. in 2007 and Cowan’s more recent figures. 
C. CONCLUSION  
 
Donegan is (yet another) case which illuminates the problems of proper application of law in sexual 
offences. But as a judgment read independently, there are positive aspects. In response to the 
deeply concerning behaviour of the trial judge’s approach to the complainer, the High Court sends a 
clear and unequivocal warning: a complainer’s dignity must be respected and her credibility will not 
be undermined by delayed reporting. This is an important message and one which should not be 
underemphasised. The judgment also continues along a path marked by previous decisions where 
the Appeal Court has shown itself to take a practical and modern view of the application of doctrines 
designed to offer special means of offering corroboration in sexual offences and it comes at a time 
                                                          
25 Cowan (n 14) at para 42. 
26 As introduced by the Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act 2002. 
27 M. Burman, L. Jamieson, J. Nicolson and O. Brooks, O. 2007. “Impact of Aspects of the Law of Evidence in 
Sexual Offences Trials: An Evaluation Study” (2007) The Scottish Government. 
28 HM Advocate v CJW [2016] HCJAC 111 
29 Elsewhere, the appropriateness of using juries as fact finders at all in rape cases has been the subject of 
question by Callender. See IMF. Callender “Jury Directions in Rape Trials in Scotland” (2016) 20(1) Edin L.R 76. 
30 The other provision pertains to the direction that a lack of physical resistance to rape does not indicate 
consent to sexual contact. Cowan notes that there continues to be no direction on the complainer’s emotional 
demeanour or clothing, however. 
when the experiences of victims of sexual offences are about to be considered in more detail31. 
However, any positivity must be cognisant of the larger (problematic) treatment of sexual offences 
in Scottish criminal procedure, as espoused by Cowan in her recent work. 
                                                          
31 See Scottish Legal News, “Judge-led review group to consider improving complainers experience without 
compromising accused’s rights” available at: https://www.scottishlegal.com/article/judge-led-review-group-
to-consider-improving-complainers-experience-without-compromising-accused-s-rights 
